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Losing a Plain View of Katz: The Loss of a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Under
the Readily Available Standard
Quin M. Sorenson*
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means
of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may
some day be developed by which the government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.... Can it be that the Constitution affords
no protection against such invasions of individual security?.
Surely our ... Constitution[] and the cases interpreting [it]
foreclose a regression into an Orwellian society in which a citizen,
in order to preserve a modicum of privacy, would be compelled to
encase himself in a light-tight, air-proof
box. The shadow of 1984
2
has fortunately not yet fallen upon us.
I.

Introduction

The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Kyllo v. United
States3 makes this Orwellian society a possibility. In Kyllo, the Court
announced a new standard by which to judge whether the use of senseenhancement technology constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment: 4 "Where... the Government uses a device that is not in
*
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1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 511 P.2d 33, 41 (Cal. 1973); see also GEORGE

1984 (Plaume/Harcourt Brace ed. 1983) (1949).
3. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
4. The Fourth Amendment provides, in its entirety, as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
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general public use. . . the surveillance is5 a 'search' and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."
Under this standard, described as the "readily available" standard,6
as soon as a sufficient percentage of the public 7 owns a device, the use
of that technology to view the interior of a home does not constitute a
search. 8 Writing in dissent in Kyllo, Justice Stevens observed: "[I]t
seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede,
as
9
the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available."
This comment argues that the adoption of the readily available
standard to evaluate sense-enhanced searches1 ° marks a departure from
existing precedent and will produce practical problems in application.
Part II of this comment examines the development of the standards used
to define conduct that constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Part III evaluates the readily available standard in terms
of its consistency with earlier decisions and its practical applicability.
Part IV considers possible alternatives and suggests a new standard that
better comports with existing precedent and that provides a more
definite standard for courts to apply. Finally, Part V concludes that the
unenhanced-perception doctrine provides a theoretically sound
alternative to the readily available standard.
II.

Searching for Standards: The Development of Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence

A.

OriginalIntent and the Sanctity of the Home
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST.

amend. IV.

5. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
6. Id. at 47 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For simplicity, this comment refers to
the standard announced in the majority opinion as the "readily available standard."
7. The precise percentage of the public that must possess a certain technology
before it becomes "general" is a matter that was not addressed by the Court. See id. at
47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally infra Part III.B (discussing practical
problems with readily available standard).
8. The Court limited the applicability of the readily available standard to searches
of the home. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31, 40. Accordingly, this comment will retain this
focus and will not speculate about potential applicability to other situations.
9. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. The term "sense-enhanced searches," used to describe any search conducted
through the use of technological enhancement, is taken from David E. Steinberg,
Making Sense of Sense-EnhancedSearches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563 passim (1990).
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be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." 1 The very
language of the Amendment makes it clear that the home is
accorded
12
special constitutional protection from unreasonable searches.
The historical underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment lead to the
same conclusion: the Framers intended the home to receive special
protection from government intrusions. 13 The Fourth Amendment was4
enacted primarily to combat the perceived evils of general warrants1
and writs of assistance,' 5 both of which granted power to officials to
search homes and seize personal effects without individualized
suspicion.' 6 Prevention of these arbitrary violations of the citizen's
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For the full text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra
note 4.
12. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31, 40 (stating that language of the Fourth Amendment
is directed primarily at protection from government intrusion into the home); United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed."); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very
core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
13. But cf James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645,
668-77 (1985) (arguing that Framers were not concerned with a right to privacy in the
home generally, but in certain information within the home).
14. The general warrant, issued by a magistrate, provided government officials
with an unlimited ability to search the home of anyone listed in the warrant, regardless
of the nature of the violation alleged. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT 30-39 (1966); see also Steinberg, supra note 10, at 574. The
ratification debates also show the Framers' preoccupation with the sanctity of the home:
"[S]uppose for instance, that an officer of the United States should force the house, the
asylum of a citizen, by virtue of a general warrant, I would ask, are general warrants
illegal by the [C]onstitution of the United States?" Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles,107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 777 (1994) (quoting ESSAYS BY A
FARMER (I)).
15. The writ of assistance is most easily described as a form of a general warrant.
Under a writ of assistance, issued by a magistrate, customs officials could engage in
arbitrary and effectively limitless searches of any home in which they suspected that
prohibited goods may be located. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 14, at 30-39; William J.
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 405
(1995).
16. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1980). See generally Richard G.
Wilkins, Defining the 'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy': An Emerging Tripartite
Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1081-86 (1987) (discussing historical origins of
Fourth Amendment). A speech by William Pitt has been described as exemplifying the
feeling of the Framers:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown.
It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through it-the
storm may enter, the rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enterall his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
NELSON S. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 49-50 (AMS Press 1937); see also Frank v.
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right to enjoy privacy within the home was the primary purpose of the
adoption of the Constitution's search and seizure provisions. 17
Early decisions of the United States Supreme Court followed the
precept that the protection of the sanctity of the home is the prime
concern of the Fourth Amendment. In Boyd v. United States,'8 regarded
by many as the first explication of the Fourth Amendment, 19 the Court
stated that its protections "apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life."2 ° Under the Boyd analysis, the method of invasion
was immaterial; if the government action violated the "personal
security, personal liberty and private property" of the2 individual, Fourth
Amendment protections applied to require a warrant. 1
B.

The Modern Evolution. From TrespassorySearches to Katz

Olmstead v. United States22 represented the next major attempt by
the Supreme Court to determine the contours of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court retreated from the possibly extensive personal
privacy protection offered in the Boyd decision 23 by limiting
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to situations in which an actual
physical invasion of the home had occurred.24 Because no physical
trespass had occurred in Olmstead, the use of a wiretap on the
defendant's home telephone lines could not be considered a search.25
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) ("The well-known
historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and
writs of assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's
house .. ");LANDYNSKI, supranote 14, at 19-48. For a more complete discussion of
the circumstances and cases that prompted the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see
Stuntz, supra note 15, at 397-409. See also Amar, supra note 14, at 774-79 (discussing
history and ratification debates of the Fourth Amendment).
18. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
19. E.g., Melvin Gutterman, A Formulationof the Value And Means Models of the
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically EnhancedSurveillance, 39 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 647, 651-57 (1988).
20. Boyd, 116 U.S. at630.
21. Id.; see also Gutterman, supra note 19, at 651-57 (describing Boyd as
embodying a "value-oriented model" of the expectation of privacy); Jeffrey J. Skelton,
Note, Infrared Imaging Technology: Threatening To See Through the Fourth
Amendment, 29 IND. L. REv. 231, 235-36 (1995) (describing "value approach" of
Boyd).
22. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
23. See Gutterman, supra note 19, at 657.
24. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
25. Id. Olmstead has been described by many as articulating the "trespass
doctrine," under which the focus of the Fourth Amendment search analysis is on
whether a physical invasion of the property has occurred. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Gutterman, supra note 19, at 656-59 (describing Olmstead as
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In dissent, Justice Brandeis voiced vigorous objections to the
Court's abandonment of the broad privacy protection embodied by
Boyd.26 In an oft-quoted passage, Justice Brandeis stated that the
Fourth Amendment "confer[s], as against the government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.' 27 According to Justice Brandeis, any
intrusion into this privacy, regardless of the means, is a search under the
Fourth Amendment.28
The Supreme Court continued to follow the Olmstead approach
until the seminal decision in Katz v. United States,2 9 in which the Court
held that a wiretap of a public telephone booth constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment. 30 The Court explicitly rejected the
"trespass doctrine" enunciated in Olmstead' and recognized that
"reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as
well as physical invasion. 3 2 The new standard announced by the Katz
33
Court by which to judge the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to
government intrusions comprises two requirements: the person must
exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy,3 4 and the expectation must
embodying a "trespass theory"); Skelton, supra note 21, at 236-39 (describing the
Olmstead "trespass model").
26. Olmstead,277 U.S. at 477-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing Boyd as "a
case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States").
27. Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted in Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S.
765, 775-76 (1983) (citing cases that quote Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead).
28. Id.(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30. Id. at 352-54.
31. Id. at 353. Although the Katz Court rejected the Olmstead method of analysis,
decisions following Katz have retained the distinction of the "curtilage" and "open
fields," a distinction established before the Olmstead decision and related to traditional
concepts of property and trespass. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-60 (1924),
reaff'd in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984); see also infra note 52
(discussing definition of curtilage). If an officer is conducting visual surveillance in the
"open fields" of the property, the officer is not conducting a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177. But see infra note 55
(discussing criticisms of trespass doctrine).
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Many commentators suggest that the decision in Katz was merely a
reaffirmation of the privacy principles announced in Boyd and lost during the Olmstead
era. E.g., Gutterman, supra note 19, at 662; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN.L. REV.349, 384 (1974).
34. For an interesting discussion of the potential ramifications of the subjective
expectations test, see Gutterman, supra note 19, at 665-72 (arguing that the "riskassumption theory" established by Justice Harlan allows government to "nullify privacy
rights"). But cf Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (stating that when an
individual has been "conditioned" to have no subjective expectation of privacy in the
home, subjective expectation should not be considered under Katz analysis); United
States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1503 n.10 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that government
cannot "make inroads upon an individual's privacy by arrogating to itself hitherto
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"be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 35 In
enunciating this test, Justice Harlan recognized that the home was still
regarded as "a place where [a person] expects privacy," and, thus,
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, but that a person could not
use the Fourth Amendment
as a shield when they expose activities or
36
view."
"plain
to
objects
C. Establishingthe Preeminenceof Plain View Post-Katz: Canines
Sniffing Garbagefrom the Air
Katz established that people do not have a justifiable expectation
of privacy in objects or activities in plain view, and, thus, official
observation does not constitute a search in these circumstances. 37 PostKatz decisions expanded on this concept by establishing several
categories in which government officials may investigate without
subjecting themselves to Fourth Amendment limitations: canine
sniffs,38 garbage abandonment,39 and aerial reconnaissance.4
The "plain-sniff doctrine" was established in United States v.
Place,4 1 in which the Court held that the use of dogs to detect narcotics
in passengers' luggage did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 42 In validating this practice, the Court focused on the
non-intrusive nature of the technique and on the fact that the sniff
detected only the presence of illegal narcotics. 43 The canine sniff was
unrecognized dimensions of privacy before subjective expectations can form"), vacated
on other grounds en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although this standard does not
come from the majority opinion, the Court has since accepted Justice Harlan's
formulation as the proper meaning of Katz. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
32-33 (2001).
36. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). It should be noted that the
plain-view doctrine, as developed in Katz and later cases, applies only to the
observation of objects, while the seizure of objects, even those in plain view, continues
to implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. See generally Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 747-49 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing distinction
between plain-view cases involving only searches and those involving seizures).
37. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
39. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
40. E.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
41. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
42. Id.at 707; see also Tomkovicz, supra note 16, at 711-12 (discussing plain-sniff
doctrine).
43. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan stated that the
Court should not have reached the issue of the constitutionality of the canine sniff, but
briefly expressed his concern with the majority's treatment of the question. Id.at 71920 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Stating that "the issue is more complex than the Court's
discussion would lead one to believe," Justice Brennan linked the sense-enhancement
capabilities attained through the use of dogs to those attained through the use of
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described as "sui generis,"" and the constitutionality of the canine sniff
was based on its peculiar properties. 4"
The "plain-waste doctrine," established in California v.
Greenwood,'6 provides that people have no reasonable expectation of
privacy, and no entitlement to protection under the Fourth Amendment,
in garbage and other material voluntarily emitted from their homes.4 7
In Greenwood, which involved an evidentiary challenge to drug
paraphernalia discovered by police in the defendant's sealed garbage
bags, the Court reasoned that it was "common knowledge" that refuse
material was available for "public consumption. 48 The owner of the
discarded material could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the material; therefore, no search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment occurred when police examined the contents of the
garbage.4 9
The "plain-aerial-view doctrine" was taken to its zenith in cases
involving aerial reconnaissance of homes. 50 In Californiav. Ciraolo,5 1
technological devices. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that, like electronic
detection devices, canine sniff "adds a new and previously unobtainable dimension to
human perception" and may implicate the Fourth Amendment). For a critical analysis
of the Court's analysis in Place, see Tomkovicz, supra note 13, at 711-12.
44. Literally, "of its own kind." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining "sui generis" as "unique or peculiar").
45. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. Justice O'Connor's statement of the holding
emphasizes the heavy factual reliance of the decision: "[W]e conclude that the
particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here-exposure of
respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine-did not
constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
46. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
47. Id. at 39-40. The dissent in Greenwood took issue with the majority's assertion
that people have a less reasonable expectation of privacy in an opaque, sealed garbage
bag than they have in a sealed travel bag. Id. at 49-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan argued that "[i]t cannot be doubted that a sealed
trash bag harbors telling evidence" of the personal activities connected with the
"'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life' which the Fourth Amendment is
designed to protect." Id. at 50-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
48. Id. at 39.
49. Id. at 39-40.
50. E.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). Although Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Kyllo,
does not cite Dow Chemical specifically for support of the readily available standard,
the standard may have had its first formulation in Dow Chemical. Compare Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("Where. . . the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use. . . the surveillance is a 'search'...."), with Dow Chem., 476
U.S. at 238 ("[S]urveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public.., might be
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."). Kyllo, however, cites Ciraolo as the
primary precedential support for the readily available standard. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 3334; see also infra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing Kyllo's reliance on
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the Court held that the use of aerial photography to view the fenced
curtilage area 52 of the defendant's home was not a search. 53 Although
the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the area, as
manifested by the presence of the ten-foot-high fence, the Court held
that the expectation was "unreasonable" because the defendant should
have known that the police, or any member of the public, could have
viewed the interior of the fenced curtilage from the airspace above his
yard.54 As long as officers were in a place in which they had a legal
right to be, 55 any observations made from that vantage point are not
searches under the Fourth Amendment. 6

Ciraolo).
51. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
52. The curtilage area is generally defined as the area immediately surrounding the
home, and this area is afforded, under Fourth Amendment analysis, a level of protection
similar to that enjoyed by persons in their home. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
180 (1984); see also supra note 31 (discussing distinction between curtilage and open
fields). The actual boundaries of the curtilage area are deducible only through a
multifaceted inquiry into the particular property, a process that has been labeled as a
"fictional question," Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145, 147 (5th Cir. 1968), but one that
the Court continues to follow. E.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. See generally S. Bryan
Lawrence III, Comment, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United States Gives
Renewed Significance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46
U. PITT. L. REV. 795 (1985).
53. Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 213-14.
54. The Ciraolo Court partially rested its holding on the premise that the airspace
in which the police viewed the defendant's property was public airspace. Id.; see also
infra note 150 (discussing holding in Ciraolo). Later decisions support the conclusion
that the police may make aerial observation of property so long as they are in publicly
accessible airspace. E.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (discussing
Federal Aviation Administration regulations to show that the officer's presence was in
generally "navigable airspace"). But cf. id. at 453 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that standard should not be whether officers were in generally
navigable airspace, but whether use of airspace was sufficiently routine).
55. Meaning, of course, that they were not trespassing. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213;
Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238; cf Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928)
(establishing trespass doctrine). Ciraolo and Dow Chemical have been criticized, with
some merit, for reintroducing the trespass doctrine of Olmstead into plain-view
analysis. E.g., Steinberg, supra note 10, at 584-91; Gutterman, supra note 19, at 71222. Professor Gutterman argues that the Fourth Amendment should be based on a
"value model," under which the reasonable expectation of privacy is gauged by the
individual's interest in privacy, whereas the integration of trespass theory establishes a
"means model," under which the reasonable expectation of privacy is gauged by the
ability of government to render activities visible. Id. at 680-97; cf infra notes 107-12
and accompanying text (discussing personal principle).
56. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213; accord Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238. For a critical
analysis of Dow Chemical and Ciraolo, specifically their incorporation of the trespass
doctrine into the plain-view doctrine, see Gutterman, supra note 19, at 712-22.
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D. Sense-Enhancement Technology Pre-Kyllo: Reconciling Plain
View andElectronicSurveillance
Although Katz established that the use of an electronic listening
device could constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,57 it did not provide concrete solutions for the analysis of
investigations using other sense-enhancement technology.5 8 While the
Court has struggled to articulate an appropriate standard under which to
judge emerging technologies, 59 post-Katz60 opinions continued to focus
on application of the plain-view doctrine.
In Smith v. Maryland,6 1 the Court was confronted with police use
of a "pen register," an electronic device with which police officers can
monitor all phone numbers dialed from a location.62 The Court, relying
on Katz, 63 held that individuals have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the phone numbers dialed because they "voluntarily64
conveyed" the phone numbers to a third party-the phone company.
Thus, the use of the pen register did not constitute a search.65
United States v. Knotts66 involved police use of a "beeper ' 67 to
track a suspect's movements over public highways. 68 The Court found
that the use of the device did not constitute a search because the
defendant "voluntarily conveyed" his travel destinations to the general

57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-54 (1967).
58. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (distinguishing
listening technology at issue in Katz from "pen register" technology). See generally
Steinberg, supra note 10 (discussing difficulty in application of Katz standard);
Gutterman, supra note 19 (same); Tomkovicz, supra note 13 (same). The disparity
among the courts of appeals with respect to the constitutionality of thermal imager
technology before the Supreme Court decision in Kyllo illustrates the variations that the
Katz standard can produce in application to new technologies. See infra note 90
(delineating circuit split). See generally Jeffrey P. Campisi, Comment, The Fourth
Amendment andNew Technologies: The Constitutionalityof Thermal Imaging, 46 VILL.
L. REv. 241 (2001) (describing pre-Kyllo circuit split).
59. Until Kyllo, of course. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)
(establishing readily available standard).
60. E.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983) (validating use of
tracking technology because defendant "voluntarily conveyed" his travel route by
traveling on public roads).
61. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
at 736 n. 1 (describing pen register).
62. See id.
63. See id at 739 (describing Katz as "our lodestar").
64. Id.at 744.
65. Id.at 743-44, quoted with approval in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
41 (1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 46-49 (discussing plain-waste
doctrine).
66. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
at 277 (describing a beeper).
67. See id.
68. Id.at 278-79.
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public by using public thoroughfares. 69 Writing for the majority, thenJustice Rehnquist emphasized that the surveillance could have been
accomplished wholly through unenhanced visual observation of the
defendant. 70 Thus, because the activities were in plain view of the
public, the police were permitted to use sense-enhancement technology
to investigate
those activities without implicating the Fourth
71
Amendment.
This conclusion was affirmed in United States v. Karo,72 in which
the Court held that the use of a beeper to track movement within the
defendant's home constituted a search.73 The Karo Court noted that,
unlike in Knotts, use of the beeper provided information from within
the home that could not be "visually verified"; 74 in other words, the
beeper provided7 5information that was not in plain view from a publicly
accessible area.
In Texas v. Brown,76 the Court addressed a more mundane class of
sense-enhancement technology, the flashlight, and validated its use by
an officer examining the interior occupants of an automobile.77 With
little discussion, then-Justice Rehnquist, citing one 1927 Supreme Court

69. Id. at 281-82.
70. Id. at 285 (stating that beeper was not used to reveal information that "would
not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin"). For an interestingand somewhat caustic---critique of Knotts, see Steinberg, supra note 10, at 593-94
(arguing that conclusion that information provided by beeper could have been obtained
through unenhanced surveillance is "simply wrong").
71. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. Rather cryptically, Justice Rehnquist stated: "Nothing
in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded
them in this case." Id. Arguably, this phrase may be interpreted as meaning that the
police may use sense-enhancement technology without fear of implicating the Fourth
Amendment. But see id at 286 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Although
the augmentation in this case was unobjectionable, it by no means follows that the use
of electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially sensitive concerns.").
However, any concern that Knotts stands for such a proposition was put to rest by the
decision in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). See infra text accompanying
notes 72-75 (discussing Karo).
72. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
73. Id. at 715-16 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
74. Id. (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
75. See id. For a critical analysis of Knotts and Karo, see Tomkovicz, supra note
13, at 704-14.
76. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
77. Id. at 740. Although Brown involved the search of a vehicle, in which
individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy than in the home, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 148 & n.15 (1978), the Supreme Court later held that the use of a
flashlight to examine the interior of a barn, within the curtilage of the home, was not a
search. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1987). See generally supra note
52 (discussing definition of curtilage).
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case 78 and a string of federal and state court decisions, concluded that
"the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply does
not constitute a search. 79 Later decisions have reaffirmed this
discussions of the constitutional
decision, all with similarly abbreviated
80
framework for the conclusion.
The Court's holding in Brown, that the use of a flashlight does not
constitute a search, 8 1 seems to suggest that the application of the plainview doctrine is not as important as the Smith, Knotts and Karo
opinions may imply. 82 However, in light of the fact that the Brown
opinion could cite to only one Supreme Court decision for supportfurther, a decision that predates Katz-may show that the Court's
decision was not an application of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
but rather of practical reality. A decision invalidating the use of
flashlights would likely bring public criticism and decrease the Court's
the use of
legitimacy-an outcome less desirable than simply validating
83
such a seemingly innocuous device as the flashlight.
Brown also may be viewed not as an unavoidable aberration, but
as the full development of the analysis employed in Knotts, in which
the Court upheld the use of a tracking beeper because police could have
gained the information through normal sensory perception.8 4 Under the
Knotts analysis, if officers would have been able to investigate the
activity without the use of sense-enhancement technology, regardless of
whether they could have done so at that precise moment, the
investigation does not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment.85 Because the flashlight merely permits the officer to
78. Justice Rehnquist cited UnitedStates v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), in which the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis, held that the use of a searchlight to make a
nocturnal investigation of the deck of a motorboat did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. ld. at 563, cited with approval in Brown, 460 U.S. at 740; cf On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) (holding that "use of bifocals, field glasses, or
the telescope to magnify the object of a witness' vision" is not a search).
79. Brown, 460 U.S. at 740.
80. E.g., Dunn, 480 U.S. at 303-04.
81. Brown, 460 U.S. at 740.
82. These cases all characterized the fact that the defendant "voluntarily conveyed"
the information to the public as dispositive of the question as to whether a search had
occurred. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1984); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
83. Cf Gutterman, supra note 19, at 696-97 (describing Brown as consistent with
public expectations).
84. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282; see supra text accompanying notes 66-71 (discussing
Knotts).
85. But cf Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001) (suggesting that,
because police could not discover information through unenhanced visual surveillance
at time of sense-enhanced surveillance, use of technology was a search); Katz v. United
concurring) (describing focus of inquiry as
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
whether the individual has evinced an immediate expectation of privacy at time of the
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perceive information that would have been exposed in daylight, its use
does not constitute a search.86
E.

ObscuringPlain View: Kyllo and the Introduction of the Readily
Available Standard

While decisions such as Smith, Knotts and Karo provided a
potential analytical framework for cases involving emerging
technology, lower courts still grappled with questions involving the use
88
87
of new sense-enhancement technologies, such as thermal imagers.
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the plain-view
doctrine, or any of its derivations, 89 validated the use of a thermal
imager and held that its use constitutes a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.9" Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated
search). Although full explication of this issue is beyond the scope of this comment, if
Brown supports an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that would permit a
reasonable expectation of privacy to be defeated if activities are now, have been, or will
be in plain view-without any temporal limitation on the inquiry-it raises potentially
troubling questions about the impact on privacy. Under this interpretation, even
encasing oneself in a "light-tight, air-proof box" may not be sufficient to guarantee
privacy if the box had ever been opened to public view. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text; see also infra note 202 (discussing need to limit temporally Fourth
Amendment standard).
86. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-AssistedPhysical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383,
396 (1997) (suggesting that use of flashlights is to "confirm" rather than to "improve"
human senses).
87. See infra note 90 (discussing pre-Kyllo circuit split on whether use of thermal
imagers constitutes a search).
88. A thermal imager detects and differentiates levels of heat emanating from a
structure, information that can be used to extrapolate the location of heat-producing
objects within the structure. E.g., United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220,
223 (1991) (describing "forward looking infrared device"); Campisi, supra note 58, at
244-45 (describing thermal imagers).
89. Although Justice Scalia's opinion focused on distinguishing cases relating to
the plain-aerial-view doctrine, see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32-33 (citing California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)), the
language of the opinion clearly rejects application of the plain-sniff and plain-waste
doctrines as well. See id. at 35-36 (rejecting argument that police are allowed to use
thermal imager because homeowner has allowed heat to radiate from home). Further,
the Justices clearly considered these doctrines and their potential application when
deciding Kyllo. See id at 44-48 (Stevens, J, dissenting) (citing California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)); see also
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001) (No. 99-8508), 2001 WL 168056, at *31, *51-52 (discussing Place and
Greenwood).
90. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. The Supreme Court heard this issue after a circuit split
had developed on the proper application of the plain-view doctrine to surveillance
conducted by using these devices. Compare United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th
Cir. 1994) (validating use of thermal imager by analogy to plain-sniff doctrine because
it is non-intrusive and limited in scope), with United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th
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that the use of the scanners permitted the police to view details of the
interior of the home otherwise not accessible to them,9' in other words,
details that were not in plain view.
Beyond this restatement of a version of the plain-view doctrine,
Kyllo also held that the use of sense-enhancement technology
constitutes a search only when the technology employed is not in
"general public use., 92 According to Justice Scalia, the development of
technology has the power to "shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy"
by reducing the area in which people may reasonably expect to be free
from public view. 93 When sense-enhancement technology becomes
readily available to the public, citizens can have no reasonable
expectation that information exposed by the use of such technology
will
94
not be perceived by either other citizens or the government.
95
III. Readily Available Standard: Problems in Theory and in Practice

The readily available standard, as described by Justice Scalia, was
not intended to mark a departure from existing Fourth Amendment

Cir. 1995) (validating use of thermal imager by analogy to plain-waste doctrine because
heat emanations constitute waste products emitted by the homeowner), with United
States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995) (validating use of thermal imager by
analogy to plain-aerial-view doctrine because officers in "open fields" may employ
such technology without implicating Fourth Amendment), and United States v. Kyllo,
190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (same), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). The Tenth Circuit
rejected these analogies and held that thermal imagers permitted the police to view
details of the home in which the owner had a reasonable expectation of privacy. United
States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds en banc,
83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996). See generally Campisi, supra note 58 (discussing circuit
split).
91. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35.
92. Id.; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (characterizing language as
"readily available standard").
93. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34. But cf supra text accompanying note 1 (quoting
Justice Brandeis).
94. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. This point does not appear to have been argued in the
briefs in Kyllo but was conceded quickly by counsel for Danny Kyllo during oral
argument. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508), 2001 WL 168056, at *23-24. Counsel for the United
States briefly stated that the case did not depend on "whether thermal imaging is so
prevalently in use that everybody would expect it would be used on their house," but no
extended discussion of the point was made. Id.at *51. See generally Kenneth Lerner,
Privacy in the Balance: Do Scientific Advances Render Our Traditional Notions of
Privacy Obsolete?, OR. ST. B. BULL., May 2001, at 9 (arguing that the Court did not
adequately examine ramifications of readily available standard).
95. The author would like to credit Justice Scalia for providing the format of this
argument. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239-61 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing, first, that new standard does not comport with past "principle"
and, second, that new standard is not workable in "practice").
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jurisprudence,9 6 but rather to serve as a concise articulation of existing
97
caselaw and to provide for more consistent application of precedent.
However, these intentions cannot disguise the fact that Kyllo marks a
radical departure from the principles announced in Katz and its
progeny.98
Further, the readily available standard will produce
problems in application.
A.

Theory: How Kyllo Loses Sight of ExistingFourth Amendment
Jurisprudence
1. The Three P's of Pre-Kyllo Theory:
and Perceptibility Principles

Presumption, Personal

Although Kyllo described post-Katz precedent as "subjective and
unpredictable," 99 three principles are clear from a synthesis of these
cases. They may be described as the presumption principle, the
personal principle and the perceptibility principle.' 00
First, the presumption principle is based on the special status of
homes under both the original intent and subsequent interpretations of
the Fourth Amendment.101 To protect the sanctity of the home, the
Amendment accords to individuals a presumptively reasonable
expectation of privacy for activities within the home.10 2 This
96. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 n.6 (stating that readily available standard is an
outgrowth of existing precedent).
97. Id.at 31-34 (describing difficulty in application of Katz and prior cases). Of
course, Justice Scalia is well known for his proclivity for bright-line rules. See, e.g.,
Mead, 533 U.S. at 247-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing desirability of bright-line
rules).
98. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing conflict between Kyllo and precedent).
99. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
100. But cf Wilkins, supra note 16, at 1080 (arguing that, under post-Katz analysis,
the Court examines "(1) the place or location where official surveillance occurs, (2) the
nature and degree of intrusiveness of the surveillance itself, and (3) the object or goal of
the surveillance").
101. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) ("At the risk of belaboring
the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally expects
privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation
is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable."); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("[A] man's home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep
them to himself has been exhibited."); supra Part IL.A (discussing original intent and
sanctity of the home).
102. See supra note 101. Hereafter, this comment will not distinguish between the
subjective and objective aspects of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although Katz
establishes this distinction, the Court seems increasingly willing to merge the two into
the concept of a "justifiable" or generally reasonable expectation of privacy. Hudson v.
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presumption can be defeated solely by operation of the plain-4iew
doctrine, under which individuals who fail to shield their activities from
the view of persons in publicly accessible areas' 0 3 lose a reasonable
expectation of privacy.' °4 However, if the activities are concealed from
plain view, the reasonable expectation of privacy becomes irrebuttable
for so long as the activities remain concealed. 10 5 Individuals who shield
their activities within the home from public perception are thereafter
06
entitled to an absolute expectation of privacy in those activities.'
Second, the personal principle arises from the plain-view
doctrine's emphasis on the actions of the individual to determine
whether that individual has exposed activities to the public and, thus,
10 7
has abrogated the presumptively reasonable expectation of privacy.
Phrased another way, the plain-view doctrine is dependent exclusively
upon the actions of the individual. 10 8 In cases involving the plain-sniff,
plain-waste and plain-aerial-view doctrines, the Court was concerned
only with the actions taken by the individual to shield the activities
from the perception of the public, not with the methods used by police
to conduct surveillance. 0 9 Although opinions such as Knotts and Karo
include tangential descriptions of the sense-enhancement technology
employed,1 10 the focus of these opinions remains on the actions of the
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 & n.7 (1984). Further, as many cases have acknowledged,
the subjective expectation of privacy seems almost per se established under
circumstances involving the home. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 21112 (1986).
103. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing integration of trespass
doctrine into plain-view doctrine).
104. See supra note 101.
105. E.g., Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-16 (holding that, after reasonable expectation of
privacy has been established, any method of government surveillance constitutes a
search).
106. See supra note 101.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (focusing on
whether individual "voluntarily conveyed" information to public). Writing in Katz,
Justice Harlan framed the inquiry in terms of whether an "intention to keep [his
activities] to himself has been exhibited." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally supra Part II.B-D (discussing Katz and
plain-view doctrine).
108. See supra note 107.
109. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Reliance on the manner of surveillance is directly contrary to the standard of Katz,
which identifies a constitutionally protected privacy right by focusing on the interests of
the individual and of a free society."). See generally supra Part II.C (discussing
development of plain-sniff, plain-waste and plain-aerial-view doctrines).
110. Karo, 468 U.S. at 707 n.6, 708-09 (describing operation of a "beeper"); Knotts,
460 U.S. at 277-79 (same). But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-43 (1979)
(examining in detail the capabilities of pen register to determine whether individual had
a subjective expectation of privacy). Although the Court in Smith emphasized the pen
register's limited capacity to transmit only numbers dialed and not the content of phone
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individual.'
In post-Katz, pre-Kyllo cases, the Court viewed the
actions of the police and the specific
technology employed as
12
essentially immaterial to the analysis.'
Third, the perceptibility principle emerges from the Court's
exclusive concern with unenhanced perception under the plain-view
doctrine. 1 3 As the name implies, the plain-view doctrine questions
only whether the individual has exposed the activities to the
unenhanced perception of the public, regardless of potential exposure 1to14
sense-enhanced perception accomplished through technological aids.
Pre-Kyllo cases dealing with sense-enhancement technology eschew
any suggestion that the use of such technology impacts the analysis of
whether the person exposed activities to the public." 5 Rather, these
cases, along with those that established the plain-sniff, plain-waste and
plain-aerial-view doctrines, limited the inquiry to whether a member of
the public could perceive the activity through the use of their own
senses, whether olfactory,' 16 tactile,' 1 7 audio" 8 or visual." 9
conversations, the decision still rested on the fact that the individual voluntarily
conveyed information to a third party, id. at 743-44, a holding that is consistent with the
personal principle.
111. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing Knotts and Karo).
112. See supra Part II.B-D (discussing development of plain-view doctrine after
Katz). See generally Gutterman, supra note 19, at 680-97 (arguing that implication of
Fourth Amendment should depend on actions of the individual).
113. See supra Part II.B-D (discussing plain-view doctrine); see also Ciraolo, 476
U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Reliance on the manner of surveillance is directly
contrary to the standard of Katz .....
114. E.g., Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282, 285 (focusing on whether activities were visible
to the "naked eye"); see supra Part II.B-D (discussing plain-view doctrine).
115. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-16 (holding that, after a reasonable expectation of
privacy has been established, any method of government surveillance constitutes a
search); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (focusing on whether individual "voluntarily
conveyed" information to the public); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (stating that
automation by phone companies is immaterial to analysis of whether individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
116. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); see also Karo, 468 U.S.
at 720 (finding that no search occurred through use of sense-enhancement technology
when officers could have followed a chemical scent to discover illegal activity). Of
course, the "direct sensory perception" in Place refers the perception of an animal, not
of a human. Place, 462 U.S. at 707; see also supra note 43 (discussing impact of senseenhancement through dog sniffs). For purposes of this comment, it suffices to define
the Court's search doctrine in terms of interspecies sensory perception.
117. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988); see also Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374-77 (1993) (articulating "plain-touch doctrine," under
which no search occurs when officer discovers an item by touch under otherwise lawful
circumstances).
118. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[C]onversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the
expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.").
119. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
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Readily Available Standard: Failure To Mind Its P's- and
Questions About Kyllo's Adherence To Precedent

Although the Kyllo majority cites many of the opinions that
established the three principles described above,1 20 the readily available
standard, under which the use of sense-enhancement technology can
constitute a search only when the technology is not in "general public
use,"
effectively abrogates the protections offered by the
presumption, personal and perceptibility principles.
First, although Kyllo professes to recognize the sanctity of the
home, 122 the opinion compromises its protection by effectively
eliminating the presumption of a reasonable expectation of privacy for
activities within the home.' 23 Under Kyllo, once a sense-enhancement
technology is held by a court to be readily available, use of that
technology to view the interior of a home 2 4 can never be considered a
search.12 5 Thus, an individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in activities within the home that may be exposed by use of that
technology. 26 The readily available standard eliminates not only the
presumption, but even the availability, of a reasonable expectation of
privacy for these activities.121
Further, the readily available standard abrogates the absolute
expectation of privacy for those who shield their activities from the
public. 128 Under the plain-view doctrine, the presumptively reasonable
expectation of privacy for activities within the home becomes
irrebuttable once the individual shields those activities from the
public. 129 However, under Kyllo, an individual who had before
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy may lose that privacy if

120. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-33 (2001); see also supra note 89
(discussing cases cited by Kyllo).
121. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
122. Id. at 31-32.
123. See Lerner, supra note 94, at 12.
124. Provided, of course, that the police are acting from a publicly accessible area.
See supra note 55 (describing integration of trespass doctrine into plain-view doctrine).
125. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (describing readily available
standard).
126. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (describing readily available
standard); see also supra note 34 (discussing risk of allowing an expectation of privacy
to be conditioned on public practices).
127. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (describing readily available
standard).
128. Cf supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing elimination of
presumption of a reasonable expectation of privacy under readily available standard).
129. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing presumption
principle).
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the police employ a technology that is readily available.' 30 The finding
that a technology is readily available trumps the
previously absolute
3
expectation of privacy enjoyed by the individual.1 1
Second, Kyllo disregards the personal principle by shifting the
focus of the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry away from the
actions of the individual. 3 2 The focus of the plain-view doctrine, as it
existed before Kyllo, was on whether individuals personally
relinquished their presumptively reasonable expectation of privacy for
activities within the home. 33 Under the readily available standard,
however, the inquiry shifts to the actions of the police and the practices
of the public. 134 If the police are using a technology that is generally
available to the public, then any actions by individuals to shield their
activities become immaterial to the analysis. 135 The readily available
standard, by shifting the inquiry away from the individual's actions,
conditions receipt of Fourth Amendment protection on the practices of
136
the public.
Third, the readily available standard abrogates the perceptibility
principle by permitting consideration of exposure of activities to senseenhancement technology. 137
Under the plain-view doctrine, a
reasonable expectation of privacy to activities within the home was
dependent solely on whether those activities were exposed to the
unenhanced perception of the public. 138 In contrast, the readily
available standard allows an expectation of privacy to be defeated even
139
if the activities were shielded from the plain view of the public.
Before Kyllo, potential exposure to surveillance by sense-enhancement

130.

See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (describing readily available

standard); see also supra note 33 (discussing risk of allowing an expectation of privacy
to be conditioned on public practices).
131. See Lerner, supra note 94, at 10-12 (discussing potential intrusions upon
reasonable expectation of privacy under readily available standard).
132. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (stating that use of
technology by public impacts reasonable expectation of privacy).
133. See supranotes 107-12 and accompanying text (discussing personal principle).
134. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34 (stating that use of technology by public impacts a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
135. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (describing readily available
standard).
136. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (describing readily available
standard); see also supra note 34 (discussing risk of allowing an expectation of privacy
to be conditioned on public practices).
137. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (describing readily available
standard).
138. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (discussing perceptibility
principle).
139. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (describing readily available
standard).
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equipment was not a factor to be considered under the plain-view
analysis; 140 after Kyllo, it becomes the sole factor in cases involving the
use of a readily available technology. 141 Under the perceptibility
principle, and under any tenable reading of the Fourth Amendment, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment
cannot be made dependent on the
42
development of technology. 1
Although, as the foregoing indicates, the Kyllo decision does not
comport with existing Fourth Amendment caselaw, Justice Scalia
argued that the readily available standard is a logical synthesis of
precedent, particularly Ciraolo.143 The Court in Ciraolo, holding that
police aerial surveillance of an enclosed backyard did not constitute a
search,' 44 noted that such low-level flights were becoming "routine. 14 5
Justice Scalia seized upon the use of the word "routine" as illustrating
that technological developments, such as better aircraft, necessarily
"shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy. 146
Besides suggesting an Orwellian future, 147 this statement
misapprehends the meaning and focus of Ciraolo.148
Ciraolo
established that the plain-view doctrine applies to all unenhanced
observation of the home made from any publicly accessible area,
including those above ground-level. While the case did stress the
increasing frequency of low-level flights, 149 the case ultimately rested
on the fact that the surveillance was conducted from a publicly

140. E.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983) (emphasizing that
information obtained through sense-enhancement technology would have been
available through unenhanced perception).
141. See Gutterman, supra note 19, at 734 ("At the root of this debate is nothing
more nor less than whether our sense of privacy and the protection afforded it by the
Constitution must bow to technological advances.").
142. Contra United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (D. Haw. 1976) ("[A]s
the technological capability of law enforcement agencies increases, the Fourth
Amendment must likewise grow in response."). Kenneth Lerner, who argued in front
of the Supreme Court on behalf of Danny Kyllo, argues that this "philosophical" issue
was not examined adequately by the Justices during oral argument. Lemer, supra note
94, at 9.
143. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 39 n.6 (2001).
144. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing Ciraolo).
145. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
146. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
147. See supra note 2.
148. Although it is argued here that Ciraolo does not provide a basis for the
adoption of the readily available standard, Justice Powell, dissenting in Dow Chemical,
which was decided on the same day as Ciraolo, foresaw just such a development. See
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 251 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("If
the Court's observations were to become the basis of a new Fourth Amendment
standard that would replace the rule in Katz, privacy rights would be seriously at risk as
technological advances become generally disseminated and available in our society.").
149. Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 215.
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accessible area. 50 The Ciraolo Court repeatedly emphasized that the
backyard could have been viewed by any member of the general
public151 and that the surveillance from the aircraft was conducted by
the "naked eye.' 52 Far from suggesting that the advancement of
technology reduces the area in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, 53
the Court endorsed a view consistent with the
perceptibility principle.'
The statement in Kyllo that technological development may
"shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy''154 suggests another argument
in favor of the readily available standard: Individuals cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy as against government senseenhanced surveillance when members of the public may invade that
privacy through the use of generally available sense-enhancement
technology.' 5 5 This argument may be rebutted on two grounds.
First, the argument misapprehends the Fourth Amendment as
being conditioned on the abilities of private citizens to invade the
privacy of others.156 The purpose of the Amendment was to protect the
privacy of individual as against arbitrary deprivations by government
officials, who may "engage in surveillance with more zeal and for
different purposes than private citizens."' 157 The limitations imposed by
150. See id. at 213-14 (citing Katz as establishing that proper test as whether person
"knowingly exposes [activities] to the public"). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Burger concluded that no invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy occurred
because "[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could
have seen everything that these officers observed." Id.Only after reaching this holding
did Chief Justice Burger continue to describe, arguably in dicta, the potential impact on
the analysis from flights in that airspace being "routine." Id.at 215. But cf Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that holding in
Ciraolowas based on fact that flights were "routine").
151. The Court noted that the backyard could be viewed not only by any member of
the public in an aircraft, but also "by a power company repair mechanic on a pole
overlooking the yard." Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 213-15.
152. Id. at 214; see supra notes 150-51.
153. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (discussing perceptibility
principle).
154. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
155. This argument was brought out more fully during oral argument in Kyllo, when
the justices questioned whether, "if thermal imaging becomes very common and every
school kid has a $5 thermal imager,. ..at that point it really would be unreasonable not
to expect that the Government was going to use to it figure out what's going on in the
house?" United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508), 2001 WL 168056, at *24. Contra supra notes 139-40
(stating that Fourth Amendment protections keep pace with technological progress).
156. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (discussing personal principle).
157. United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Haw. 1976); accord
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment "confer[s], as against the government, the right to
be let alone").
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the search and seizure provisions do not apply to private actors' 58 and
neither the language nor subsequent interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment 159 suggest that those limitations are somehow based on the
ability of private actors to invade the sanctity of the home. 60 An
expectation of privacy as against the government becomes no less
worthy merely because
other citizens have access to means to intrude
161
on that privacy.
Second, the argument that advancements in technology decrease
the sphere of privacy effectively bases entitlement to constitutional
protection on the wealth of the individual. 62 The Fourth Amendment
was intended to offer protection to the "poorest man" as against
government intrusions. 63 However, if advances in technology serve to
reduce the area of constitutionally protected privacy, the only method
by which individuals can ensure their own privacy is to invest in
devices that are sufficiently advanced to defeat any readily available
sense-enhancement technology, an expense that the "poorest man" is
unlikely to be able to afford.' 64 The Constitution is egalitarian in its
protection, 65 offering a guarantee of privacy as against government

158. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921), cited with approval in United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984). In Burdeau, the Court stated that the
"origins and history" of the Fourth Amendment "clearly show that it was intended as a
restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority,... as against such authority it was
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen." Id.
159. Other than Kyllo. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (stating that technological development
limits expectation of privacy).
160. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 660 (1980) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment) (stating that ability of private actors to engage in searches does not
impact limitations on government actors to conduct similar searches); see also
Gutterman, supra note 19, at 684 (arguing that, under the "value model," the Fourth
Amendment "serves as a limitation on government actions and distinguishes between
the people's privacy expectations from their government and privacy from other
individuals").
161. See Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1256 ("The fact that Peeping Toms abound does not
license the government to follow suit.").
162. See Lemer, supranote 94, at 12.
163. See supra note 16 (quoting William Pitt).
164. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he
privacy of the home [might] hinge upon the outcome of a technological race of
measure/counter-measure between the average citizen and the government-a race, we
expect, that the people will surely lose."), vacated on other grounds en banc, 83 F.3d
1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
165. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-19 (establishing right of indigent
defendants to be furnished, without charge, transcripts for appellate review). Failing to
offer egalitarian protection to all citizens, rich and poor, may be described as
constitutionally sacrilegious: "Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt
not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in
righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor." Leviticus 19:15, quoted in Griffin, 351
U.S. at 16 n.10 (1956).
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intrusion to anyone who takes the minimal steps of shielding activities
from unenhanced perception from publicly accessible areas. 166 The
premise of the readily available standard, that privacy is conditioned on
technological advancement, 167 risks stratifying society in terms of those
who can afford privacy and those who cannot.168
B.

Practice:Problems in Application of the Readily Available
Standard

The readily available standard's problems in theory are matched
by its problems in application. Kyllo creates practical difficulties for
lower courts in three ways: first, it fails to provide substantive rules for
application of the readily available standard; second, it involves
technical analysis outside the expertise of courts; and, third, it invites a
substantial increase in litigation.
The Kyllo opinion leaves unanswered the question of the
substantive standard by which the Court will decide if the technology is
currently "in general public use."'169 In Kyllo, the Court declined to
discuss whether thermal imagers were in general public use and simply
concluded that "we can quite confidently say that thermal imaging is
not 'routine."" 70 However confident the Kyllo Court may have been,
the opinion provides no guidance to lower courts on the proper
substantive standard to determine whether a technology is readily
available.' 71 Does a forty-nine percent market-share mean that the
technology is readily available or does the Constitution requires a
majority market-share? 172 Does a device become readily available only
when "every school kid" owns one? 73 These questions, raised by the
166. See generally supra Part III.A.1 (discussing development of presumption,
personal and perceptibility principles).
167. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
168. See Lerner, supra note 94, at 12.
169. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 39 n.6. But see United States v. Deaner, No. 1:CR-92-0090-01, 1992 WL
209966, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992) (stating that thermal imagers have been
available to the general public "off the shelf' for fifteen years), quoted with approval in
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995).
171. Cf People v. Katz, No. 224477, 2001 WL 1012114, at *2 n.4 (Mich. Ct. App.
Sept. 4, 2001) (concluding that, under Kyllo, devices "sold at retail may very well be in
'general public use').
172. Cf Deaner,1992 WL 209966, at *2 (discussing availability of thermal imagers
in the marketplace).
173. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508), 2001 WL 168056, at *23-24. At oral argument, the
Justices suggested that, "if thermal imaging becomes very common and every school
kid has a $5 thermal imager," then in "that world, which is an odd world," people
would "[expect] everybody under the sun to know whether they are taking baths or
not." Id.
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by Kyllo, virtually guarantee
readily available standard and unanswered
174
uncertain application by lower courts.
The second practical problem with the readily available standard is
that it forces courts to consider, in some detail, the nature and effects of
emerging technology. 175 To determine whether a particular technology
is readily available, courts must first classify the technology. 176 A
thermal imager that detects only heat emanating off the walls may be
classified differently from a more advanced system that functions like
an x-ray machine. 177 This type of highly technical analysis is outside
the normal areas of expertise of judges and lawyers; 178 yet, the readily
available standard forces judges to confront these issues on a regular
basis. 179 Courts should remain focused on an area in which they are
perfectly capable of judging-whether the person exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy by insulating the activity from

174. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that lack of clarity
in articulation of readily available standard will produce inconsistent application).
175. The oral argument from Kyllo indicates the difficulties legal professionals
experience in discerning the nature and limits of technology:
QUESTION: ... So you're taking information from inside the house. Maybe
our problem is my seventh grade science class. I mean, I used to think,
perhaps wrongly, that sound went to a wall, then the electrons start to vibrate
in the wall, and pretty soon the wave goes outside, and here it seems to me
heat goes to the wall, heats up the wall, and then the heat goes outside, so I
just find it difficult to distinguish between sound and heat ....
[Counsel for the United States]: Well, but my seventh grade science classes
don't help me very much with this, either ....
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001) (No. 99-8508), 2001 WL 168056, at *50. See generally Carl B. Meyer, Science
and Law: The Quest for the Neutral Expert Witness, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 35, 55-61 (1997) (discussing legal professionals' lack of expertise in scientific
areas).
176. Cf Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36 (discussing radar and ultrasound devices as
alternative technologies that produce interior imaging); People v. Katz, 2001 WL
1012114, at *2 n.4 (classifying use of "night vision binoculars" to detect "visual
images" as different from use of thermal imagers to detect "invisible heat levels").
177. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41-44, 46-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
differences between a thermal imager and technologies that detect movement in interior
of home); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing
between thermal imagers that are the "functional equivalent" of an x-ray machine and
those that merely detect heat from outside of walls).
178. Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985)
(describing classification of persons with mental retardation as "a difficult and often a
technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and
not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary"); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (noting that agency interpretation
should be accorded deference by judiciary because "[]udges are not experts in the
field").
179. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidentiary
hearing is necessary to determine whether technology is readily available).
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180
unenhanced public perception.
Finally, the readily available standard will produce intense and
protracted litigation in application.1 81 A finding by any court that a
technology is "in general public use'1 82 potentially impacts privacy
protections around the country; therefore, privacy rights advocates will
be compelled to litigate fully each claim that a technology is readily
available.' 83 Governmental parties will be equally persistent, because
such a finding potentially means a drastic increase84 in the surveillance
abilities of police departments around the country.1
Courts will be required not only to rule on the availability of
emerging technologies, but also to rule repeatedly on the availability of
existing technologies as they become more accessible to the public.
Even a pronouncement by the Supreme Court that a technology is not
readily available would not foreclose further litigation on the issue,
because these technologies are constantly developing. 85 Regardless of
the type of pre-trial hearing required,186 the readily available standard
will lead to a sharp increase in the workload of courts.

IV. Searching for New Standards: Alternatives to the Readily
Available Standard
A.

Functional-EquivalentStandard.-Basing Plain View on SenseEnhancement Technology

Although the readily available standard satisfies neither theoretical
nor practical needs, the Kyllo opinion suggests a possible alternative
180. See, e.g., United State v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 285 (1983) (focusing on
question of whether information obtained was exposed to unenhanced perception); see
also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) (holding that serial numbers on
bottom of stereo were not in plain view of officer and, thus, search occurred when
officer moved stereo to reveal numbers); supra Part I1.B-D (discussing development of
plain-view doctrine).
181. Cf Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidentiary
hearing is necessary to determine whether technology is readily available).
182. Id. at 34.
183. Cf supra note 90 (citing cases from courts of appeals dealing with litigating
issue of whether use of thermal imager constitutes a search).
184. Cf Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36 (suggesting that such decisions potentially affect
surveillance abilities of all police departments).
185. Id. at 36 n.3 (identifying development of new surveillance technologies "to
'see' through walls and other opaque barriers [as] a clear, and scientifically feasible,
goal of law enforcement research and development"); see, e.g., David E. Kalish,
Intelligence Works To Get Smart; Privacy May Get Lost in the High-Tech Race Against
Terrorism, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 4, 2001, at Al (discussing development of
surveillance technologies).
186. Justice Stevens suggested that a full evidentiary hearing may be required for
each new technology. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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test: The use of sense-enhancement technology constitutes a search only
when it "provides its user with the functional equivalent of actual
presence in the area being searched."' 8 7 Although this test answers
some of the practical criticisms of the readily available standard by
eliminating consideration of the extent to which technology is publicly
to adhere to the
available,' 88 the "functional-equivalent standard" fails
89
presumption, personal and perceptibility principles.
First, the functional equivalent standard fails to recognize the
presumptive existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy within the
home.190 Rather, as the phrasing of the standard makes clear, it accords
an expectation of privacy only under circumstances in which the
technology does not provide the user with the functional equivalent of a
search. 191 As under the readily available standard, once a court
determines that a particular technology does not satisfy the functional
equivalent standard, a presumption of a reasonable expectation of
privacy cannot attach92 to activities within the home that may be exposed
by that technology.'
Second, the proposed standard fails to focus on the actions of the
individual, as required under the personal principle.' 93 Under the
functional equivalent standard, courts potentially need to ask only
whether the use of technology provided the functional equivalent of
actual presence in the home. 194 If not, courts, without reference to the

187. Id.at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A version of this test was also enunciated in
the majority opinion: "We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
at 34. Of
ld.
I..."
obtained without physical [intrusion] ...constitutes a search .
course, Justice Scalia went on to say that this statement holds only when "the
technology in question is not in general public use." Id.
188. However, the functional-equivalent standard does not answer all the practical
problems identified earlier. See supra Part II.B (discussing problems in application of
readily available standard). For example, this test would still require the court to make
the scientific determination of the nature and scope of the technology in order to
determine whether it could provide the user with the functional equivalent of being
within the home. See id.at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing difference between
"through-the-wall" and "off-the-wall" surveillance technology); see also supra notes
175-80 and accompanying text (arguing against a standard that focuses on technology
issues).
189. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing development of three principles from preKyllo precedent).
190. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing presumption
principle).
191. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between
readily available standard and presumption principle).
193. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (discussing personal principle).
194. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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actions of the individual, must conclude that no search has occurred. 95
The functional equivalent standard eliminates consideration of the
actions of the individual even though the personal principle dictates that
these actions should be the sole factor in the analysis. 196
Finally, the functional-equivalent standard requires consideration
of the potential exposure to sense-enhanced perception1 97 in
contradiction of the perceptibility principle, which requires the court to
concentrate exclusively on the potential exposure of the activity to the
unenhanced perception of the public. 198 Under the functionalequivalent standard, a person who takes all necessary steps to shield
activities from the plain view of the public may still be ruled not to
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 199 Like the readily available
standard, the functional-equivalent standard improperly establishes
exposure to sense-enhanced perception, rather than 200
to unenhanced
perception, as the benchmark of the plain-view doctrine.
B.

Unenhanced-PerceptionDoctrine:BadName, Good
Jurisprudence

To satisfy existing precedent and the theory underlying the Fourth
Amendment, the standard for determining whether surveillance
impinges upon a reasonable expectation of privacy must comport with
195.

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

196. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (discussing personal principle).
197. In order to determine whether a technology provides the user with the
functional equivalent of being inside a home, the court must first examine the ability of
the technology to expose the details of the home. E.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (describing difference between "through-the-wall" technology, which
provides user with "functional equivalent" of being inside the home, and "off-the-wall"
technology, which does not).
198. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (discussing perceptibility
principle).
199. For instance, if the activities are perceived through the use of a thermal imager.
See Kyllo,. 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that use of thermal imager
was not a search because, although interior of home was not in plain view, thermal
imager merely displayed information exposed to the public and was not the functional
equivalent of "direct access" to protected area).
200. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between
readily available standard and perceptibility principle). Although beyond the scope of
this comment, it should be noted that Professor Gutterman proposes an interesting
standard based on the "value model" of the Fourth Amendment. Gutterman, supra note
19, at 722-35. This standard rejects the incorporation of the trespass doctrine and
argues that the "central focus" of the inquiry should be on "whether the privacy interest
at stake is desirable in our society, unfettered by imposed risks." Id. at 725. Although
this test would seem to satisfy the three principles described earlier, it does not conform
to the precedent of Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, which establish the trespass doctrine as
part of the plain-view analysis.
See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text
(discussing Ciraolo,Dow Chemical and reintroduction of trespass doctrine).
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the presumption, personal and perceptibility principles. 2 1 A variation,
more semantic than substantive, of the plain-view doctrine
accomplishes this goal-the "unenhanced-perception doctrine." Under
this doctrine, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
activities conducted within the home if, at the time of the search, 2 the
activities have been shielded from unenhanced perception from publicly
accessible areas.20 3
This standard fully incorporates the three principles that arise from
synthesis of pre-Kyllo precedent.20 4 The standard properly accords a
presumption of a reasonable expectation of privacy to activities within
the home, a presumption that becomes absolute if the activities are not
exposed to plain view. 20 5 It focuses on the actions of the individual as
providing the sole means by which the presumptively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the home may be defeated, without reference

to the techniques and technologies used by police.20 6 Finally, it permits
consideration only of whether the individual has allowed activities to be
exposed to the unenhanced perception of the public, with no
consideration of the possible effects of sense-enhancement
technology. 20 7 Thus, the unenhanced-perception doctrine satisfies the
theoretical requirements of the presumption, personal and perceptibility

principles.
Moreover, the unenhanced-perception doctrine reduces the
judiciary's involvement in repeated, highly technical inquiries into the
availability and nature of emerging technologies.20 8
Under this
201. See supra Part III.A. 1 (discussing three principles of pre-Kyllo precedent).
202. The inclusion of the phrase "at the time of the search" is intended to limit
temporally application of the standard. See supra note 85 (discussing dangers of plainview doctrine without temporal limitation).
203. It should be noted that this standard continues to adhere to elements of the
trespass doctrine in allowing police to conduct unenhanced surveillance from any
publicly accessible area. See supra notes 22-25, 31 and accompanying text (discussing
trespass doctrine); supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (discussing Ciraolo and
Dow Chemical and reintroduction of trespass doctrine). Thus, a potential criticism of
this test is that it continues to require courts to consider the actions of the police in
determining whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See supra note
53 (discussing criticism of trespass doctrine). However, it seems clear that the Court
has firmly incorporated the trespass doctrine into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
204. See generally supra Part III.A.1 (discussing presumption, personal and
perceptibility principles).
205. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing presumption
principle).
206. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (discussing personal principle).
207. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (discussing perceptibility
principle).
208. But cf supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (discussing necessity of
examining technology under readily available standard); supra note 188 and
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standard, courts are required to do nothing more than consider whether
individuals effectively blocked their activities from perception by use of
ordinary, unenhanced senses.20 9 In cases such as Kyllo, this would
eliminate the need for judges to consider whether the information could
have been obtained by the use of a thermometer attached to a stick 2 10 or
a more sophisticated version of thermal imager that detects "throughthe-wall" rather than "off-the-wall" emanations.2 11 If the government
cannot establish that the information could have been obtained by
unenhanced perception, the reasonable expectation of privacy is
established. The unenhanced-perception doctrine offers a standard
consistent with prior precedent and lends itself to application by courts.
V.

Conclusion

The readily available standard, which eliminates the presumption
of a reasonable expectation of privacy for activities in the home if the
sense-enhancement technology used to perceive those activities is "in
general public use," 21 2 marks a serious departure from existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and the core values underlying the privacy
protections offered by the Constitution.21 3 The Fourth Amendment was
intended to prevent the evils accompanied by the use of the general
warrant and writ of assistance; 214 however, such procedural devices are
unnecessary when the government may use sense-enhancement
technology to peer into the home without impacting a reasonable
expectation of privacy.2 15
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Constitution should
protect against "every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon
accompanying text (discussing necessity of examining technology under functionalequivalent standard).
209.

See supra text accompanying note 203 (articulating unenhanced-perception

doctrine).
210. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508), 2001 WL 168056, at *22 ("Supposing the police had
rented the house next door, and they leaned out the second story window with a long
pole with a thermometer on it, they could kind of track the wall and find out what part
was hot and what wasn't, would that violate the Fourth Amendment?").
211. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

212. Id. at 34.
213.

See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing conflict between readily available standard

and precedent).
214. See supra Part II.A (discussing original intent and sanctity of the home).
215. Justice Brandeis recognized a century ago that "[a]s a means of espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and
oppression when compared with wire tapping." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Steinberg, supra note 10, at 574-77
(discussing similarities between amount of information obtained through senseenhanced searches and by the general warrant).
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the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed," 21 6 but the
readily available standard forces the Constitution to "bow to
technological advances. 217 It endorses an "Orwellian notion that
shrink as the
precious liberties derived from the Framers simply
218
government acquires new means of infringing them."
doctrine, under which the
The unenhanced-perception
presumptively reasonable expectation of privacy for activities in the
home may be defeated only if individuals expose their activity to the
unenhanced view of the public,

2 19

satisfies the core values of the Fourth

Amendment with respect to the sanctity of the home, and allows courts
to avoid involvement in highly scientific evaluations of technology. It
establishes a rule that is "not only firm but also bright, ,220 in contrast to
the theoretical and practical difficulties of the readily available
standard. Although Justice Scalia's attempt to craft a rule to deal with
emerging technologies is22 1admirable, "[t]he people in their houses...
deserve more precision.

Before it becomes entrenched in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court should abandon the readily available standard.
Adoption of the unenhanced-perception doctrine in its place will ensure
that the protections of the Fourth Amendment remain inviolable for all
citizens and will finally provide an answer for Justice Brandeis:
Regardless of the "progress of science in furnishing the government
absolute "protection
with means of espionage," the Constitution affords
222
against such invasions of individual security.,

216. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
217. Gutterman, supra note 19, at 734.
218. People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 299, 305 (Cal. 1985); see also supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
219. See supra Part IV.B (discussing unenhanced-perception doctrine).
220. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
221. Id. at 39.
222. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
For the question, see supra text accompanying note 1.

